The Credit Crunch and The Insolvency Arena

September 28, 2008

The 700 Billion Deadly Sins?

Filed under: Uncategorized — Steve Curnutte @ 4:17 pm

More like 700 billion...

More like 700 billion...

There may be only 7 deadly sins to keep an eye out for, but there are 700 billion reasons for Americans to pay attention this weekend.

Like the Bear Stearns news, like the Fannie Freddie news, and like many other emergency actions in this season of extraordinary things, the agreement on the bailout plan will probably be announced today (Sunday) just before the opening on the Asian markets.

Without exaggeration, the entire political and economic world waits anxiously for news from our Congressional leaders. Few times in human history have so many people been connected to each other in so many ways. As we have all climbed higher by the interlocking steps of global commerce, so could we plunge and fall by the stumble of one.

Does something need to be done? Absolutely. Does it need to be done quickly? Absolutely. Is this bailout plan the best option? Maybe.

The stakes of never been higher. Paulson’s original request was said to be only a few pages long. The bullet points of the rumored deal today may only be a few pages more. Our concern? The DNA of America’s economic future will be written by bickering politicians (most of them trained as lawyers). The powers within the plan tinker with the deepest parts of our economic engine. The risk for devastating unintended consequences is too great to be ignored. A plan that pleases everyone will help no one. A plan that is diluted to the lowest agreeable denominator will allow holes into which demons will sneak.

Our main concerns? Hard as the politicians try to convince us otherwise, this plan will not turn a profit for the American taxpayer. The loans they will be forced to buy are too damaged, they are secured by property that has depreciated too far, and no healing of the markets will make them attractive enough in the future to be sold at a reasonable profit.

Even though the balance sheet of the Federal Government is the largest on the planet, this episode will leave the deepest of scars on her face. Of course the Congressional Budget Office let us know this weekend that they plan to zero out the whole episode like a simple credit and debit. We will borrow 700 billion and the value of what we have bought will be 700 billion – voila! – we are fine! But this ignores the fact that the Treasury will spend an obscene amount of money trying to administer this massive plan. It also ignores the fact that the valuation of the loans is not based on a real market value, it will be set by the Government itself when the purchase is made! Imagine this conversation with your CPA. “I borrowed 1 million dollars to buy this chunk of lead even though no one else on the planet would even pay a nickel for it. However, could you please value it at 1 million on my financial statement so I will not look so bad? Thanks – you are the best!”

Proud as we are of our American system, our government does not have the best track record of being a well oiled and efficient machine. To believe that they will be able to buy hundreds of thousands of bad loans, call those who are struggling and renegotiate their mortgage to a manageable level – it, well, it would be funny if it were not so painful. To put the size of this crisis into perspective, when Indy Mac failed, the FDIC owned 740,000 loans overnight. No less than 60,000 of those loans were in trouble and required a phone call. Indy Mac was a spoonful; this bailout is an ocean.

And last, this plan has placed our collective feet on the slipperiest of slopes. What will keep your neighbor from halting his payments so his loan will be bought up too? Shouldn’t everyone get a chance at a little renegotiation now and then? After all, his house depreciated just like yours.

Warren Buffet says that if we do not do something, the financial system will totally meltdown. Falling into chaos does not sound so good. But the ’something’ we should do stares at us like a giant question mark.

Our solutions come from lessons of the past. First, tempting though it may be, do not over regulate. Second, make sure the plan is temporary and has its own end written into the beginning. Third, stop the maniacal dedication to affordable housing mandates. And fourth, build a framework to better insulate politics from monetary policy, and pandering from fiscal policy.

Do not be tempted to over regulate.

Deregulation has been vilified; defending it is near heresy these days. We do need to modify our oversight. We do need to regulate better, but if we react to this grave crisis by introducing punitive regulation under the powerful thumb of Federal control, we will strike an irreparable blow to the core of our American soul. It is not a new argument to be sure. Jefferson and Hamilton could not agree, nor could Jackson and Clay. But the balance struck by their conflict build into our DNA the roadmap for prosperity. The middle road has given us decades and decades of unfailing economic power, unrivaled military power, and unparalleled ingenuity. It will be our national disgrace and our greatest shame if wade our American republic into the black waters of socialism.

Make sure the intervention is temporary.

The plan must have a self destruct timer. Historically, it is easy for a government to begin to provide a service or function. It is nearly impossible to take it away. Remember what happened to the Roman Emperors who gave out food to curry favor with the public in times of need. Taking the food giveaways back later proved a bit more difficult. The blank check to Freddie and Fannie should have been accompanied by this clear mandate. You will shrink quickly, your credit card will be cut up, and you will go to the private sector and work for your bread and butter. You may not slop at the public trough again. Ever. The same should be said to Wall Street wizards. Any failure of the monsters you create will be your failure too. You can keep all your winnings if you win, but you will suffer the same punishment and loss as the rest of us if you do not. Risk will no longer be decoupled from reward.

Affordable housing in small doses please.

Communities need socioeconomic diversity to be healthy. Home ownership lifts up communities in remarkable and mysterious ways. Our American dream is as much a human one as a cultural one. But politicians started handing out the American dream like a dime store trinket. They threw about down payment assistance programs and subsidies and tax breaks like gold coins in a mob. In their arrogance and in their ignorance, they cared more for their own reelection than for the potentially devastating consequences of their actions. If they were too stupid to know the peril of their choices, they deserve no more forgiveness or reprieve than those who ruthlessly ignored the signs. The stench of ill gotten political gain lingers all about our last three presidents and lays thick in the halls of our federal and state buildings. There are honorable people in politics – but tragically few indeed. We are all to blame for placing them there – for such is our right, and such is our folly.

Politics is a strange bedfellow of monetary and fiscal policy.

The founding fathers culled wisdom from thinkers all over the world to formulate our constitution. Hundreds of years of thought and political philosophy were hammered into our American bones and boiled into our American blood. Separating the functions of governance and giving each a glimpse and a hand into the other was the great genius of the age and the most precious of gifts to posterity. The remarkable connectivity of the modern world, more specifically the astounding economic interdependence of our modern world, demands that we author a new chapter. Monetary policy and fiscal policy are too near our political whim. No President should ever call a Fed chief and ask them to lower rates to please the American public. No tax break should ever be simply in return for support, or a contribution. No tax increase should ever be simply a matter of social engineering. Admittedly, financial levers move social wheels and vice versa; they always will be connected at the deepest level. But we must endeavor to design a new system of separation, with checks and balances, that will guide our decisions in a more diligent and careful manner.

September 26, 2008

Extinction – Washington Mutual

Filed under: Uncategorized — Steve Curnutte @ 8:41 am

This bird is extinct. So is WaMu. Do you think that is also the sound the bird used to make? WaMu?

This bird is extinct. So is WaMu. Do you think that is also the sound the bird used to make? WaMu?

A few hours ago, Washington Mutual failed. The FDIC seized the bank late Thursday evening. It is the largest bank failure in US History, and not by a little.

WaMu was more than 100 years old and at $307 billion, it shattered the record set back in 1984 by Continental Illinois Bank at $40 billion and the IndyMac failure at $32 billion in July of this year. Looks like the FDIC insurance fund will not have to shoulder cash deficits for depositors because J P Morgan Chase will buy some to keep things from a disaster.

Last fall, in this economics column, we predicted WaMu would fail before Halloween 2008. We reiterated our prediction a few weeks ago. We also predicted a total of 50 bank failures by the same time. So far, there have been less than 20 in this cycle. Last fall, we also predicted the Dow would be at 9000 by Halloween. Looks like we might have been wrong about that too.

For bank failures, there were 3 last month and 3 this month:

Washington Mutual Bank September 25, 2008
Ameribank, Northfork, WV September 19, 2008
Silver State Bank, Henderson, NV September 5, 2008
Integrity Bank, Alpharetta, GA August 29, 2008
The Columbian Bank and Trust, Topeka, KS August 22, 2008
First Priority Bank, Bradenton, FL August 1, 2008

For a full list, and more information go to the FDIC site.

Look carefully at Wachovia, it may too go the way of the DoDo. Here in Tennessee, we are fortunate to have banks in good shape. However, there are two banks specfically that we believe have very dangerous fundamentals and are at risk of failure.

Manage your cash in this way – no more than $100,000 in any account. You can play the game of opening several accounts with the same bank under different titles (one for you, one for your spouse, one jointly, etc.), but it may be cleaner and easier to simply diversify your cash between banks. Do not hold your cash in money market accounts unless you specifically know that they are FDIC insured.

If you have a significant amount cash, consider the CDRS program. One your behalf, the program puts money in CD’s at the FDIC maximum amount in dozens or hundreds of different banks. Essentially, it makes certain that all of your cash is backed by FDIC insurance. The program is only available at community and regional banks (large banks are not allowed to participate because their size would create an imbalance with the reciprocity agreements in the CDRS program). You can insure up to $50,000,000 in cash this way. Good idea right now.

Our parent company, InsBank, has the program and we would be happy to talk with you about it. But many other banks offer the same thing. As always, we would love to earn your business, but we place a higher premium on you getting the information you need than us making a buck.

September 25, 2008

Your mortgage. Right now. Make it a Vault.

Filed under: Uncategorized — Steve Curnutte @ 1:36 pm
Make your mortgage a vault.

Make your mortgage a vault.

Over the last year, we have made several pleas to consumers to refinance. Each time it is the same thing – even if you do not use Finworth, please go ahead and take care of it. Don’t go to a dingy Countrywide office in a strip mall and use the loan officer who is still there because no one else would hire them when the ship began to sink last summer. Don’t call your cousin who just got a job at a bank. Underwriting guidelines are more complicated and more difficult than we have ever seen. One mistake in documentation, one mistake on an appraisal, one miscalculation as to when you should lock, and you could miss your opportunity.

But this plea is different. We are no longer begging you to take care of your mortgage, we are now fully convinced that if you do not do it now, you may not be able to do it at all.

If you have an ARM, get rid of it. Period. This is no time for reading the tea leaves with rates.

If you have a balloon, get rid of it. Period. You may not like your options down the road when the loan balloons and you are forced to refinance or sell.

If you have a significant amount of money that is on a variable rate loan (like a HELOC on prime or a monthly adjustable based on LIBOR), get rid of it if you have the equity in your house to refinance. Period. These benchmark rates could be very volatile in the gathering storm.

If you have PMI and need to refinance your loan to get rid of it, or if you have an FHA and have the equity to refinance it to a conventional without MIP, do it. Period. Your future options may be limited.

This is the time for sensible action; for a conservative posture. This is the time to work with someone who knows what they are doing, who has been doing it awhile, and who you can trust. Again, we would be delighted to earn your business. But more importantly, we want you to take action while the underwriting climate and the interest rate climate and the home value climate is still relatively strong. We think there is a significant risk for each of those things to move against us.

Respectfully and Sincerely Yours,

Steve Curnutte and the folks at
Finworth Mortgage, an InsBank Company

www.finworth.com
Borrow Wisely

September 24, 2008

GenM – Generation Mortgage

Filed under: What does the mortgage crisis mean? — Steve Curnutte @ 4:57 pm

GenM - it even rhymes.

GenM - it even rhymes.

GenM. Lovers of leverage. Devourers of debt. Credit Couture. The Mortgagentsia.

Some clever name will be devised by some clever person that will identify the group of folks who were born just before the credit boom and lived through its drunken heyday. Everyone is sick of hearing about baby boomers. Generation X labeled a whole group as slackers. Generations y and z, or was it Generation Next, are unclear because it seems they are defined by the fact that nothing really defines them. But GenM? We can all agree that these people have lived through something powerful. Something undeniably important. Something colossal and lasting.

What then? What has this group lived through? What are they defined by?

Mortgage. They grew up among the construction trucks, the second homes, and the speculative fever. They grew up when everyone was a landlord, everyone needed a downtown condo to be fulfilled, everyone could borrow, everyone could lend. Real Estate was more than a place where you lived, it was a way that you lived. They grew up around credit cards, and car leases, home equity lines and interest only loans. They grew up in houses so large their parents could not hear them laughing or fighting or watching TV or listening to iPods or searching YouTube.

The watched all of us swim in a soup of dollars; a pool so large and so deep that it saw no end to the frolicking and fun. They grew up in a time where risk was decoupled from reward. Risk was a distant thought. Loss was something that happened to people who lived through the depression. Even our leaders were judged by their hair style or their accent or their makeup job at the town hall meeting about nothing.

GenM was taught to recycle their endless stream of water bottles while their own government devoured more resources than an entire African nation. GenM loved reality shows because a show about nothing was the only thing more interesting than a life about nothing.

GenM will be remembered by the empty condos in Las Vegas and Miami. By the hulking mansions in the suburbs around the country. By the scars on Wall Street. By the political paralysis of a government outclassed by their private sector counterparts. GenM will be remembered as the ones who looked to their leaders and found too late that they were woefully undereducated and unprepared to deal with a debilitating crisis.

But most of all, GenM will be remembered for their maniacal love of borrowing. And the rest of us will remember how we lent it to them, how we encouraged them, and how utterly we failed them.

To Bail or Not to Bail…

Filed under: What does the mortgage crisis mean? — Steve Curnutte @ 1:55 pm

Yes, it is a mess...

Yes, it is a mess...

All else pales. McCain wants to cancel the presidential debate. Americans are realizing that this news is more than just news programs crying wolf. It is a frightening time.

The logic for the bailing to commence.

Japan had a real estate bubble and a credit bubble. It popped and no one admitted it. A culture filled with stoicism and obsessed with public appearances tried to hide the poison. Keep in the belly of the economic organism. Twenty plus years later, they have still not recovered. Get it out say the proponents! The body needs to reject this toxin. Cleanse Wall Street of the bad loans by buying them with Federal money. We are not bailing out millionaires who did dumb things, we are saving our American Economic System from utter destruction. Some of the loans will go bad, some will be paid back, some of the underlying assets will be reclaimed and sold. The government (us) will be paid back at least some directly. But we will all be paid back indirectly as the economy heals, as the stock market heals, as our wealth begins to rebuild.

The logic against the bailing…

We should let them fail. They made bad choices, let them lose it all if that is what it takes. If mark to market accounting is causing the write downs and the vicious cycle of increasing borrowing costs, then change the rule. The tax payers should not put this kind of money on the line. We could all go down in this flush. Even if the plan might work, Congressional leaders are so greedy they will tack on every ugly project they can think of and the whole thing will be a disaster. The Bankruptcy Code will change, hand out programs for the poor with make us an even nation with an even greater welfare class. We will embolden Wall Street giants to act even more recklessly in the future because they will now know for certain that someone will always bail them out.

Most are not even sure what happened in the first place. It is hard to propose a fix when you don’t even know the problem. It is even harder to criticize a fix for a thing that you never even understood in the first place. By the way, no one understands this entire problem. It is too deep, too broad, too complex and too esoteric.

But once again, in our little corner of the mortgage world, we find ourselves in the center of the storm. We are going to speak at a few different business schools in the coming weeks. Still writing articles. Still going on news programs.

The idea of the bailout bothers me because I don’t like socialism. But I still must agree that it needs to be done. The cancer cells must all be cut out at once. It must be bold, large, and final. But agreeing to the bailout reluctantly still comes with these provisos.

First, no pet projects please. The arrogance and the greed of our Congressional leaders is thick and unpalatable. The plan should be clean and free from their meddling. Please, for once, could we have a congress that cares about the nation more than their re-election? No handouts, no subsidies, no down payment assistance programs, no federal judges renegotiating mortgage debt. Please.

Second, the bailout must have in its DNA the plan for its own demise. The powers cannot be permanent. The federal programs it puts in place must end soon. As tax payers, the price we pay for this bailout must surely be rewarded with the mercy to have it disappear with a whimper not a bang. Let’s buy up the loans, dispose of the debt and the assets in due haste, and shutter the operation. Let us all look back on this sad chapter as our national folly, while at the same time look back on the dissolution of this bailout program as our national pride. We came close to the flame of socialism, we all felt the heat, but we had the courage to pull back.

Third, we need to use this extraordinary moment, when all things hang in the balance, as a moment to plan for our prosperity. Legislation to prevent this type of credit bubble must be put in place – but it must not be punitive. Regulation must step a bit more into the mix, but not to a reactionary degree. Americans need to understand the dangers of leverage, but we should not be afraid to take risks.

Extraordinary times breed remarkable consensus, or engender black fear. Either condition can bring about massive change. One looks to the future for possibility and promise, the other looks to the past for blame and punishment. One will breed a new and prosperous economy and a more sharply defined national image, the other will chain us to a dissention and discord. Which will be our choice? Which will be yours?

September 17, 2008

The Calculus of Risk

Filed under: What does the mortgage crisis mean? — Steve Curnutte @ 3:14 pm

Don't panic like these people...

Don't panic like these people...

Since January, the Dow has lost 2655 points. From 13,264 to 10,609.

Today, the Dow lost 450 points.

Like a massive glacier carving up a mountain, the credit crisis is re-scultping the face of Wall Street. Century old institutions are vanishing over a weekend. Should we worry? Should our clients worry?

We are not wealth mangers, we are not financial wizards. But the mortgage world and the credit world are the cause of all this pain – and we do understand that corner of the financial markets pretty well.

The bad news is, the pain is not over. It will come in three ways:

First, large financial institutions are too battered to handle the next round of waves. More subprime ARM’s adjusting, the pay option ARM crisis that has barely been talked about will soon hit. If there was any remaining value in the loan pools, it will soon be gone. Mark to market accounting will drive balance sheets into painful territory, short sellers will pile on, borrowing costs will shoot up – the big financials are in for more dislocation and loss.

Second, community and regional banks that behaved badly will continue to struggle. Their construction loans are dying, their development loans are dying, and their second mortgage loans are dying. To add to the woe, some of them were shareholders in Fannie and Freddie. Their cost to insure their portfolios is spiking while at the same time they have to put tons of cash away for loss reserves. Any short term borrowing they have been doing will soon be too expensive to obtain, or more accurately, there will be no one there to renew the short term debt. If they have clients who own buildings with retail tenants, the economic slowdown will pinch the tenants, then the landlords, then the banks.

Third, the insurance companies and financial companies (some already included in the company above) who handled the credit default swaps (insuring loan pools and structured investment vehicles against the risk of default) will become strained. They will not be able to pay; they will be ostracized by what is left of the lending world. They will not be able to meet obligations and the systemic shock will be immense.

The consumer debt triumvirate of auto loans, chattel loans, and credit cards will certainly make a psychological dent on the consuming public, but it will pale next to the real show.

Energy prices will continue to be a de facto growth tax until a major breakthrough forces us to shake off the old mantle and assume a new one. Part of that mantle is foreign oil and part of it is simply a connection to old technologies and old worn out solutions.

The good news? It must happen. Things will turn only after it does. Some of us would rather swallow the medicine all at once. The government cannot stretch its balance sheet any farther. The dollar is already strained to the limits of credulity. There can be no soft landing here. As we have been saying for nearly 14 months now, there was never a chance in the first place of engineering our nation out of this crisis with fiscal bailouts and monetary policy bailouts.

The other good news is that inflation will not need to be strangled out of the economy as in the past. The economy itself will slow down and drag it out by the root.

Small consolation. But the final stages of this pain can now play out. It might take another year of significant loss and pain. It might take some very valuable things with it. But at least now it can start the long walk out the door.

The math failed. The PhD’s failed. The calculus of risk was ignored. There was no democratization of debt. There was only amplification of debt. Decoupling risk from reward did not unfetter the markets for growth, it chained them to a sinking ball. Risk and reward are connected at the hip. It is axiomatic. Fundamental. You can not pledge risk free debt, for more debt, in order to insure debt, in order to make more debt without someone, somewhere having to pay.

The calculus of risk says a free market, functioning within the confines of an oganized society, must have the freedom to succeed AND the freedom to fail.

September 16, 2008

The moral hazard of a put.

Filed under: What does the mortgage crisis mean? — Steve Curnutte @ 7:42 pm

What would he say?

What would he say?

If you buy a put on a particular stock, you are betting it will go down. If it goes down as far as you hope, all sorts of good things kick into gear and your position is salvaged. A put is a backstop to some investors. If the price falls to a certain point, there is always that put there to salvage something from the downward movement.

A put for a parent is similar. If every time my kid runs up a credit card, I smack him on the wrist, pay it off for him, and give it back to him, I am giving him a put of sorts.

Insurance is a form of a put is some ways. If things get really bad, insurance will pay for the house or the car, or even death. Leave that nice car parked in a bad lot downtown all night? Ahhh, shucks, if it is stolen and blown to bits, at least I have insurance!

So what is all the talk of a put in the markets these days? What is a Moral Hazard? What is the Lender of Last Resort Put? What is the Greenspan Put?

The moral hazard in serving as a put for my child is that my child will probably never learn to manage money because I am always bailing him out. The moral hazard of any kind of insurance is that I might take more risk than I would have otherwise since I know someone else will bail me out. The moral hazard of a Lender of Last Resort is…well…that something like out current crisis might take place.

Financial bubbles of the past (asset, stock, commodity, credit) would burst and wreak havoc on a market. People would lose everything. Companies would fall. Entire dynasties would fail. Governments would suffer. Empires would crumble. These colossal failures are well documented and go back centuries. It got people thinking, perhaps we are now sophisticated enough that we could create a banking system, a system of governance, that would serve as the last stop on the way to bedlam?

Of course we would never use such a lender of last resort unless we absolutely had to do so! Of course we would only intervene if something were too big to fail! If the failure of a thing were to pose a systemic risk to our economic structure then, and only then, would we dash in with a mask and cape to save the day.

Greenspan (yes, The Maestro) did a lot of really great things, and he is an incredibly intelligent guy. But every time the markets whined, he threw them a bone. For more than a decade (almost 2), he made sure we all knew the full force of Federal Monetary Policy and a good deal of Federal Fiscal Policy was going to bail us out.

Let’s review. We are going to give politicians the ability to bail something out if it gets in trouble. They would never abuse that just for the sake of maintaining popularity. Right?

To make it even more interesting, most of the politicians who made the rules by which this process domestically would happen are former lawyers. Most of the politicians, who are making the decisions as to whether or not we should engage this put, are lawyers. Most of the lawyers I know (not all!) are incredibly good at explaining a million reasons for not doing a thing, then proposing the most complicated solution for moving forward. A solution with so many twists and turns that it absolutely guarantees there will be serious unintended consequences.

Take the idea of a Put. Something that could encourage reckless behavior.

Take the idea of Moral Hazard. The danger posed when always bailing people out.

Take the idea of Political Will. Only as strong as the smell of the next election.

Take several hundred failed lawyers with a pathological need to be liked. And you have….

You have a bunch of people who are too young to remember what real calamity is like. You have Wall Street Wizards, Cowboy Bankers, Wildcat Mortgage Bankers, Greedy Mortgage Brokers, and Greedy Real Estate Investors – all as living proof of the moral hazard of a put. You have…2008.

Another thought? The failure of a poorly run company, or of a reckless bank, might occasion one to say as did Mark Twain…”I did not attend the funeral, but I sent a nice letter saying I approved of it.”

September 15, 2008

“They stumble that run fast” – Shakespeare

Filed under: What does the mortgage crisis mean? — Steve Curnutte @ 7:52 pm

Running too fast?

Running too fast?

Bear Stearns is gone. Absorbed into JP Morgan by a meddling Fed.

Lehman Brothers is gone. Well, in Bankruptcy after 150 plus years.

Merrill Lynch is gone. Absorbed into Bank of America this weekend out of fear.

Goldman Sachs is still around. Everyone says Morgan Stanley is fine but we have our doubts. Watch their stock drop this week as the market seizes. What about the nation’s largest thrift, Washington Mutual? Even at more than 100 years old, we have been betting since late last fall that it will fail. How is it possible that it was so obvious to everyone except these firms? We wrote about it last summer. Most of the big investment banks thought their biggest assets were really complicated, very risky debt instruments. In order to make money, they pledged these debt instruments as collateral to borrow money and make more risky debt instruments.

That last part is worth repeating again. I pledge a bunch of credit instruments as collateral to borrow money. I leverage myself completely with almost no margin for error. I furiously search for ways to feed all of my debt payments by…borrowing more money. In fact, I rely on the well oiled machine of the markets every single day to loan me enough money to keep me going. When it blows up I am surprised? It is like a Nissan plant making a car. If one of the suppliers hits a snag, the whole operation shuts down – they lose millions of dollars every minute. In this case, the drug dealers, errr…I mean suppliers…I mean the short term money lenders just folded. They could not lend to these investment banks anymore. They could not lend to anyone. In fact ‘they’ did not exist.

The moment things fell apart last summer, two things happened that set off a furious and a vicious chain. First, investment banks and hedge funds and Structured Investment Vehicles just could not borrow money every day to keep the rickety shack standing – that market vanished. Second, the collateral that the investment banks held was a bunch of whacked out credit instruments that were worth less and less every second, making it hard to find money elsewhere. Then came the furious chain. Their assets were worth less and less so they had to pledge more and more to borrow whatever they could. They spiraled downward, punished as much by the invisible hand of Smith as by their own arrogance.

They were running wide open for years. They were running at capacity for years. The thought of failure drifted further and further away. The risks they were taking seemed democratized over hundreds of parties. Their bets seemed always to win. The velocity of dollars and data out stripped any hope of calm in the storm.

Did they stumble because of that dreadful subprime bump in the road? Did they stumble because a foreign competitor tripped them?

I don’t think so. They stumbled because they were running too fast.

September 8, 2008

Fannie and Freddie are taken over…biggest news since this whole thing blew up.

Filed under: Uncategorized — Steve Curnutte @ 12:05 am
Change this sign to 'Uncle Sam'

Change this sign to Uncle Sam Mortgage Inc

Plenty to digest in the post below. But if you do not have time to read it – please remember this…Paulson’s move today (Sunday) makes it VERY LIKELY that 30 year fixed rates will FALL SIGNIFICANTLY for a few days then BOUNCE BACK UP. If you have a rate about 6.375% on a 30 year fixed, or if you have an ARM, you must act quickly. We have almost 8 million dollars of you already on a watch list and we will be calling you as you requested to go over your options. This is very likely to be short lived (if it happens at all) so please be prepared to make a decision quickly.

Now on the boring stuff. We did not try to put all of this info down in regular prose form. Tomorrow is likely to be loaded with work so we are favoring a bullet point format to get this to you – hope it helps some!

What will this do to my stock portfolio/mutual fund portfolio?

Foreign markets (proxy for Sovereign Wealth Funds and Foreignn Central Banks) will love it because they will see it as a small sign that the beginning of a US housing recovery is at least in sight. They will love it because it bolsters the confidence in their significant holdings of Treasuries and in Mortgage Backed Securities issued by Fannie and Freddie. Japan’s Nikkei for example gained 430 points (3.6%). Paulson’s Sunday announcement was timed for the Asian market opening. Domestic markets will like it too. The shares of Banks who are holding a lot of Fannie Freddie stock will improve because people now know they won’t be wiped out. Other equities will do well on a general relief that the other shoe has finally dropped AND the general feeling that this will help home owners in some way.

What will this do to the dollar?

Dollar will remain stable or gain. Currency traders have already priced in the fact that the 5 trillion of Fan Fred mortgage debt is on the government books. Before it was implied, now it is explicit. Lower oil and weaker foreign economies are powerful fundamentals that this news will not dislodge.

Who really wins and looses in this deal?

Republicans nudge up since they have hated Fan and Fred all along and wanted them smaller. This plan (although slowly) is supposed to make the giants smaller. McCain can take the moral high ground since he has resisted contributions from Fan and Fred Lobbyists

Shareholders win a little because even though they lose their dividends, at least now they know they are not going to get wiped out.

Homeowners with equity and good credit win a little – rates should fall some and they might be able to refi.

Banks who held a lot of Fan and Fred are glad their investments will not be wiped out – some worried that a wipe out would add to the pain in the banking sector – they will all feel better.

Paulson’s street cred will bounce – he finally stepped up with a solution that is ruthlessly middle of the road.

Bill Gross at Pimco is a happy man. His bonds in Fan and Fred are safe – and boy does he have a lot (just tripled his bet thinking this might happen)

Lobbyists take a black eye and get cut off. They have earned a170m in the last 10 years (3.5 of it in the first qtr this year alone!) protecting the indefensible. 42 lobbying firms are now cut off. And they deserve to be. Party is over.

Democrats will lose because they have provided shelter for Fan and Fred for years – and the strongest criticisms of their behavior have now come to pass. Obama has some explaining to do, he has received 105k from donors tied to Fan and Fred – the 3rd largest recipient in Congress.

What does ‘nationalize them’ mean?

Paulson and company have taken the least pernicious version of nationalizing. It is a conservatorship, not a receivership. One says I am going to take you over and make you do better, giving the exiting party goers at least some decent options. The other is – you are in bankruptcy, most people are going to get wiped out, this party is over.

Who are the people that are now in charge?

At the top, the brand spanking new FHFA (Federal Housing Finance Administration) and their Grand Poo Bah James Lockhart.

Behind the curtain, Henry Paulson and Ben Bernake.

At the helm of each Fan and Fred (taking orders from the top dogs) is Hebert Allison a 65 year old former Merrill guy, recently at TIAA CREF. And David Moffett, a 56 year old life time banker from Bancorp.

Mudd’s name is now really mud and Syron is gone too.

What does ‘cost the American tax payer mean?’

Some say the money the gov is putting up for the purchase of new stock and the money that the gov will lend Fan and Fred will never turn out to be a good investment and will never be paid back. Some say it might seem like the government is taking on several trillion more in obligations, but assets offset those obligations and one day all of this will be fine. The point is, the degree of loss to the American taxpayer depends on the length and depth of the housing problems. It could go either way.

What are each of Presidential candidates saying/not saying?

One of THE MOST fascinating things about this entire crisis is the neither of them talk much about it, and when they do they are extremely general. Part of the reason is that the problem is immensely complicated, is not yet worked out, and that neither of them understand it. Part of the reason is that both of them have been bragging about how important Fan and Fred are to the housing market, and that any rescue plan should not help greedy investors. However, the bailout plan makes government bigger, and costs the American tax payer (and it really was one of the only options!) So the candidates have a hard time saying, ‘it is critical’ and ‘don’t fix it’ at the same time. They also don’t want to be caught staking a claim on quicksand – and this world has been shifting a lot.

What will this do for home owners in trouble?

Nothing directly. Indirectly, one could argue that this will help the housing market some by making rates lower and lending easier (or at the worst make lending stop the slide of tightening standards).

What will this do to 30 year fixed rates for good borrowers like me?

It will help anyone with a 30 year fixed rate above 6.375%, and anyone with a conforming ARM with good credit who needs to refinance. In other words, this move should shrink the unreasonably high spread between the 10 year Treasury and the 30 year fixed rate. This should bring rates down into the 5’s and spark a mini wave of refi’s. This will only help Prime borrowers who still have reasonable equity and could potentially refinance.

September 5, 2008

The Endowment Effect – why some people do not mind throwing the keys back to the lender…

Filed under: What does the mortgage crisis mean? — Steve Curnutte @ 7:38 am

Decoupling Risk

Decoupling Risk

Somewhere in the world right now, there is an incredibly bright person hammering out a paper in the field of Behavioral Economics. They are using terms like ‘Heuristics’ and ‘Equity Premium Puzzle.’ I am sure the paper will be great – but I will probably never understand it. That is not to say their research is not important, only that my world is more about the day to day solutions that clients need to make their way in one of the most challenging credit environments in several decades.

However, one area of their study caught my eye recently. It is called ‘The Endowment Effect’ (sometimes referred to as ‘Divestiture Aversion’ – how is that for a long way of saying ‘I don’t like losing things that are mine’). No one yet is applying it to the housing market or the credit crunch – but it resonated very deeply with me and seems to explain at least part of the puzzle very well.

The end of the story is this – as the government forced more and more affordable housing mandates, more and more people could buy houses for less and less of a personal investment. Get a down payment assistance grant, get some seller paid closing costs, get a 100% loan amount and…poof! You own a home for less than it costs to buy a burrito. By the way, that is not a joke. Quite literally in 2005 and 2006, a half-witted mortgage broker could combine several of the above listed stratagems and help someone get a house for absolutely no money out of their pocket. Not even earnest money. In fact, is some cases, their first payment would not even be due for 75 days from the day of closing. Wow. My theory is that this decoupled the feeling of risk from the process. It also diminished the endowment effect to a point of insignificance.

So what is the Endowment Effect? What is the beginning of the story?

The beginning of the story. Many researchers claim they have identified a phenomena in people (and even in some primates) whereby an individual will assign greater value to something simply because they possess that something. In other words, I ask you how much an object is worth by pointing to it, you would say one thing. If I give it to you and then ask you how much it is worth, you would name a higher value.

The first and one of the most famous studies was done with chocolate bars and coffee mugs. People were asked which one they would prefer. Most of them said chocolate bars. A second group was given the coffee mugs first as a gift, and then asked if they would like to trade for a chocolate bar, most of them refused.

The study has been repeated with stock brokers and investment choices; with Duke University students and basketball tickets. The critical piece of most of the studies is that the endowment effect practically goes away when the researchers used tokens instead of objects. In other words, a chip representing a chocolate bar just did not do the trick. Not everyone agrees on what to call it – or what the real reason for the phenomena is – but it hit me like a ton of bricks.

Surely the endowment effect is most pronounced with houses? After all, it is the ultimate possession. We wrap it into our identity, we rely on it to provide safety and safekeeping, we keep our food there! Why would people readily throw their keys back to the lender if times got hard?

One could say it is because the cost of staying (mountains of debt, a lifetime of struggle to pay it) is so much higher than the cost of leaving (the relative shame of foreclosure or bankruptcy). One could say it is because they feel cheated by the price drop in the markets, or that the laws of the land make it too easy to walk away. Maybe the shame of leaving is diminished because everyone else seems to be doing it too. These reasons are all, of course, part of the puzzle. But ultimately, I suspect something deeper is at the root.

I believe the endowment effect is very strong when it comes to people and their homes. I also believe that if you make owning a home feel like renting, then it is little more than a token. In other words, promoting home ownership to the point of practical absurdity only created a situation where people did not feel like home owners.

We have written in this column many times the great reverence with which we regard property ownership rights of all kinds. These rights are foundational and they are critical to our culture. Promoting home ownership is absolutely right. Promoting affordable housing mandates with fiscal and monetary policy is absolutely right. But when the promotion of these mandates is diluted by political greed and corrupt ambition, they tend to go too far. Pushed to an extreme as in 2005 and 2006, the mandates actually decouple the feeling of ownership from the reality of ownership. In doing so, they present a grave and systemic risk to the entire financial system.

At this point, neither of the presidential candidates seems to be aware of this critical distinction. One gets the feeling that the enormity and the complexity of the housing crisis renders them mute. Or more accurately, since all the reasonable solutions will produce more pain before they produce results, there is no political motivation to discuss the problems at any level. Uncomfortable things are often left off the grandstand.

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